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Often it takes an outsider to give us insights into our own activity or discipline.
 
Such is the situation with the present volume. Leon Grunberg with training in edu­

cation and sociology gained in the UK and the U.S., offers much food for thought
 
_ not just for professors in colleges of business, but also for managers in large
 
companies and consultants in market or financial research firms.
 
The heart of the book consists of three major case studies from the turbulent mid
 
1970s. Two are from the automotive and one is from the office equipment field.
 
British Leyland acquires but then abandons Innocenti of Italy; Chrysler pulls off a
 
threatened withdrawal from the UK, if only for three years; and Litton Industries
 
woos then discards Imperial Typewriters of Britain, turning a "cash cow" into a
 
"dog." An appropriate subtitle for each case might have been: Life in the multina­

tional corporate jungle - how large firms romance smaller ones - how they find
 
them, milk them, and leave them.
 
The reading is lively in each of the three case study chapters. The author has
 
been able to dig out astonishing details from corporate files and from interviews
 
with numerous - but anonymous - executives. He also tracked down dusty gov­

ernment reports, obscure journal articles and such gems as a doctoral disserta­

tion written in Milan. But we get more than juicy tidbits or petty accusations;
 
Grunberg is able to pull together sensitive information from various sources,
 
cross-check them to a great extent, and then glean insights from his interviews.
 
At the end of the book, the case studies are combined in order to offer some use­

ful generalizations, though not policy recommendations.
 
Several threads run through the text. Some of these are tackled well; some are
 
dealt with in a cursory fashion, and still others are swept under the rug. Thus, Grun­

berg deals well with his central question: How and why do parent firms divest
 
subsidiaries in an international setting? He is also skillful in demonstrating the
 
interaction between and the strength of both external forces (economic condi­

tions, competition, and so on) and internal forces (individual and group power
 
plays, machinations by parent and subsidiary managers). But the author does not
 
weight these factors in any meaningful fashion; and, despite lengthy references
 
to prior studies, he does not relate well his findings to those of others. Finally, the
 
impact of divestments on workers, customers, and communities is barely touched
 
upon, despite promises to the contrary. Grunberg vacillates between reining in
 
multinationals or letting them loose in today's competitive markets. The call for
 
more disclosure, longer layoff notices, and consulting with governments is made,
 
but in a rather perfunctory manner; at least, there is no recommendation for bu­

reaucratic rules and regulations.
 
The two brief introductory chapters which explore the nature of international di­

vestment are the weakest part of the book. While the chapters are short, they seem
 
tedious. Simplistic or awkward statements, dry documentation, and failure to ex­

tract meaningful data from previous works characterize these pages. The causes
 
and consequences of divestment in a global setting are really not probed at great
 
length or in great depth. (Chapter 2 on this topic offers eight pages of text and
 
three pages of forty footnotes, many with multiple references.) The data mar­

shalled should have been put into tables or appendices. Vague statements such
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as the following one on page 15 should be deleted: "Hopefully, they (the case 
studies) will indicate whether we are on the right lines and perhaps point out 
areas that we have missed altogether." 
Chapter 3 is a defense of the author's methodology- but there is no need to apol­
ogize. Grunberg calls his painstaking collection of information "the long march." 
Getting inside large firms, tracking down willing executives, cross-checking the 
details obtained with others constitute an incomplete process, a judgment­
convenience sample. Certainly, not every folder could be obtained, not every 
executive was willing to speak even anonymously or off the record. But Grunberg 
was able to elicit comments from many; he seldom entered an interview without 
already having data on hand. This way, he involved his subjects; approached the 
topic from different angles, and arrived at a generally well balanced view of the 
process and the outcome. 
In the reconstruction of what happened in each of the three major cases - Chap­
ters 4 through 6 - the author follows a sensible format: reasons for the acquisition; 
factors affecting the performance of the subsidiary; the process of withdrawal and 
the consequences for the parties involved; and, reasons for the actual or threat­
ened divestiture. Grunberg's analysis is at its best when he focuses on the parent­
subsidiary working accord and on such specific topics as transfer pricing, com­
petition, layoffs, product and marketing strategy. The evidence is quite clear that 
the parent uses centralization and planning to achieve control and coordination. 
There is much turmoil, bargaining and "wheeling-dealing." The parent prevails 
not only because it has a broader view and heavier responsibilities, but because 
it has the clout; the subsidiary is often kept in the dark even about its present or 
future role. (An analogy with the human family is tempting!) 
The British Leyland-Innocenti relationship pits a large, lethargic multinational 
against a previously well-managed small Italian firm. The weak parent puts the 
adverse impact of recessionary and competitive forces on the shoulder of the 
subsidiary, thereby "exporting its crisis." But ultimately, as one punster put it, the 
guilty as well as the innocent shall perish. The Chrysler UK case foreshadows the 
enormous problems which finally beset the large U.S. parent in the late 1970s. 
What is surprising here is how Chrysler was able to buy time, display favoritism 
toward other subsidiaries and still manage to stave off defeat on the British front 
- at least for three years. And the Litton Industries-Imperial case illustrates fur­
ther how parent firms have favorite kids (in this case Triumph-Adler) and less 
favored children (that is, Imperial). The former get the chocolate, the latter the 
breadcrumbs. With a dated product line and a circumscribed marketing plan, Im­
perial did not have much of a chance to grow to successful maturity. 
Chapter 7 pulls together the common findings from the three major cases quite 
well; Chapter 8, by contrast, is far too brief as a concluding statement and offers 
no policy recommendations whatsoever. The author is able to demonstrate in his 
review of the three cases that there is more to the failure of multinational ven· 
tures than "the conventional wisdom." Yes, subsidiaries fail because they have 
not done well in a sharply competitive marketplace. But similar firms have pre­
vailed. It turns out that the foreign subsidiaries could handle their local rivals, but 
not those from other countries. The key factor which broke the subsidiaries' back 
was the encroachment of the parents on their (the subsidiaries') discretionary 
powers. The internal, political environment - rife with power plays by individuals 
and groups - proved to be too great an obstacle. Grunberg would argue: Give the 
child a chance to grow up. But, alas, life is not as simple; when a parent has a 
wide-flung family, some members may have to be reined in and starved, so that 
others may live. 
Positive facets of this volume range from a lively narrative to in depth analysis of 
three significant cases, from the discovery of sensitive information to a broader 
perspective than a narrow managerial view. Negative features include minutiae 
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and trivia scattered throughout the text which do detract from the analysis; the 
lack of weighing the factors responsible for the demise of acquired subsidiaries; 
and the failure to link the findings to results reported by others (for example, Sach-
dev, Torneden). On balance, the positive features outweigh the negative ones by 
an order of 3:1. 
Andrew C. Gross 
The Cleveland State University 
